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We look at the impact of a binding minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare distri-
butions in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job
search. We use two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Nash bargaining problem. In one, ﬁrms engage in
a Bertrand competition for the services of an individual, as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In
the other, ﬁrms do not engage in such competitions, and the outside option used in bargaining is
always the value of unemployed search. We estimate both bargaining speciﬁc a t i o n su s i n gaM e t h o d
of Simulated Moments estimator applied to data from a recent wave of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation. Even though individuals will be paid the minimum wage for a small pro-
portion of their labor market careers, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the minimum wage on the ex
ante value of labor market careers, particularly in the case of Bertrand competition between ﬁrms.
An important futures goal of this research agenda is to develop tests capable of determining which
bargaining framework is more consistent with observed patterns of turnover and wage change at
the individual level.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C5, D83, J31
Keywords: Minimum wage; On-the-job search; Renegotiation; Matching functions.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The impact of minimum wages on the welfare of agents on the supply and demand sides of the labor
market has been at the center of an age-old policy debate on the proper role of the government
in the economy. The standard elementary treatment of minimum wage policy views its impact
as unambiguously negative. In a competitive market in which unrestricted supply and demand
forces combine to determine a unique equilibrium employment and wage level, the imposition of a
minimum wage greater than the market clearing wage creates true unemployment, deﬁned as the
situation in which individuals who are willing to supply labor at the going wage rate are unable
to ﬁnd jobs. It creates ex post inequality as well, in that those individuals fortunate enough to
ﬁnd jobs have a higher welfare level than they would have had in the competitive equilibrium,
while those who do not will have lower welfare levels. If individuals are risk-averse, this increased
“uncertainty" may be welfare decreasing in an ex ante sense, as well.
It has long been appreciated that, for minimum wages to have beneﬁcial eﬀects (at least for the
supply side of the market), there must exist labor market frictions and/or multiple equilibria.1 The
multiple equilibria case (see van den Berg, 2003) is perhaps the strongest one for the beneﬁcial eﬀects
of government-imposed wage policies. There are a large number of labor market models that can
produce multiple equilibria, which occurs when the “primitives” of a labor market environment can
produce a number of diﬀerent labor market equilibria.2 If, for example, two equilibrium outcomes
are possible, with the supports of the wage distributions associated with the two equilibria non-
overlapping, then a minimum wage placed below the lower bound of the support of the higher wage
distribution and above the upper bound of the support of the lower wage distribution can serve as
an equilibrium selection device that ensures selection of the preferred equilibrium.3
The equilibrium search models of Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
1There are a number of papers in the literature that consider the possibility of welfare-enhancing minimum wage
rates (e.g., Drazen (1986), Lang (1987), Rebitzer and Taylor (1996), Swinnerton (1996)), though the frameworks in
which the models are set tend to be relatively abstract and the models themselves are typically not estimable. These
are important contributions, but in this paper we focus mo r eo nm o d e l st h a th a v eb e e no ra r ec a p a b l eo fb e i n gt a k e n
to data.
2Some examples of labor market models that can easily produce multiple equilibria involve statistical discrimination
(see, e.g., Moro (2003)) and the general equilibrium search model with contact rates determined through a non-
constant returns to scale matching function (see, e.g., Diamond (1982)).
3This presumes that the higher wage distribution is associated with the Pareto optimal equilibrium. If this is not
the case, implementing a maximum wage policy would select the preferred equilibrium.
1oﬀer another venue for positive minimum wage eﬀects on welfare, once again, at least for the
supply side of the market. In the Albrecht and Axell model, potential ﬁrm entrants into the
market are heterogeneous in terms of quality. A high minimum wage prevents low-quality ﬁrms
from making nonnegative proﬁts, and hence improves the labor market through a selection eﬀect
on the demand side. Having higher quality ﬁrms competing for their services improves the wage
distributions individuals face while searching. As the model is written, there is no adverse impact
on employment rates.
The Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium framework allows for on-the-job (OTJ) search
in addition to unemployed search. As do Albrecht and Axell (1984), they assume a wage-posting
equilibrium in which ﬁrms oﬀer a ﬁxed wage to all potential and actual employees. The Burdett
and Mortensen framework does not require heterogeneity in the populations of (potential) ﬁrms
and workers, in fact it assumes no heterogeneity. They prove the existence of an equilibrium in
which the probability that any two ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage is zero. Adding a minimum wage to
their model simply shifts the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution to the right and has no adverse
employment eﬀects. As a result, binding minimum wages are beneﬁcial to the supply side of the
market.
The framework we use posits search frictions, as do the two we have just discussed. Diﬀerently
from those two models, an important component of our model is heterogeneous productivity. In
particular, when a potential employment opportunity is found after some period of search, the
productivity of the match, θ, is determined by taking a draw from some ﬁxed distribution G(θ). It
is typically assumed that the value of the match for a given possible worker-ﬁrm pairing is observed
i m m e d i a t e l yb yb o t hs i d e s ,a na dmittedly strong assumption.4 Once the draw is made, the pair
can determine if there exists positive surplus to the potential match. “Positive surplus” is said to
exist if there exists any wage rate at which both sides would prefer creating the match to their next
best options of continued search. If there exists positive surplus to the match, the worker and ﬁrm
bargain over its division. In general, both sides have some degree of bargaining power, because the
other side cannot ﬁnd a perfect replacement for them without spending additional eﬀort and/or
resources. In this case, the ultimate source of bargaining power to both is search frictions.
As is common in this literature, we use axiomatic Nash bargaining to determine the division
4Jovanovic (1979) emphasizes the role of learning about match quality in explaining separation decisions and wage
progression at a ﬁrm. He expands his framework to include unemployment in Jovanovic (1984). The bargaining
process is not emphasized in his approach.
2of the surplus between the worker and ﬁr m .T h em i n i m u mw a g ea c t sa sas i d ec o n s t r a i n to nt h e
Nash bargaining problem. Depending on the form of the equilibrium wage function, the minimum
wage may act to preclude the formation of otherwise acceptable matches. This corresponds to the
standard negative employment eﬀect associated with a competitive markets framework. Secondly,
for all acceptable matches after the imposition of the minimum wage, the minimum wage aﬀects
the bargained wage both directly and indirectly. The direct eﬀect is obvious: for bargained wages
less than m without the constraint, if the match is viable, the wage oﬀer must be increased to m
to comply with the law. The indirect eﬀect is associated with the change in the outside option
(in the Nash bargaining problem) associated witht the minimum wage change, even when the the
constraint itself is not directly binding. In the minimum wage empirical literature, this is often
referred to as “spillover.” Our framework gives a behavioral motivation for the existence of such an
eﬀect.
This research extends the model of Flinn (2002, 2006) to the case of on-the-job search. Using
Current Population Survey (CPS) data, he estimated a continuous time model of matching, search,
and bargaining (Flinn, 2006) in both partial and general equilibrium settings. In the partial equi-
librium case, it was assumed that the rate of contact between unemployed searchers (there were
no employed searchers) and ﬁrms was ﬁxed; in particular, it was invariant with respect to changes
in the minimum wage. In the general equilibrium case, the contact rate was modeled using the
matching function setup (see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000), in which the contact rate is a constant returns
to scale (CRS) function, with its arguments being the measure of unemployed searchers and the
measure of posted vacancies. Given a social welfare function that weighted the average welfare of
individuals and ﬁrms in the population equally, Flinn used estimates of primitive parameters to de-
termine optimal minimum wage values under the partial and general equilibrium assumptions. He
found that the partial equilibrium model implied optimal minimum wages of approximately $8.50
an hour (when the mandated federal minimum wage was $4.25), while in the general equilibrium
framework the optimal minimum wage was only $3.35. The results of testing exercises led him to
conclude that the empirical evidence supported the partial equilibrium speciﬁcation of the model.
The addition of on-the-job search to the bargainingm o d e li sac r i t i c a le x t e n s i o n .M o s to b v i o u s l y ,
from descriptive evidence we know that in the U.S .l a b o rm a r k e tt h e r ea r eal a r g en u m b e ro fj o b -
to-job transitions that don’t involve an intervening spell of unemployment. By ignoring this fact,
there exists the potential for a signiﬁcant degree of model misspeciﬁcation, leading to inconsistent
estimates of model parameters and misleading policy implications drawn from those estimates.
3The addition of on-the-job search is likely to be particularly relevant for purposes of investigating
minimum wage eﬀects on labor market outcomes. The work of Leighton and Mincer (1981), and,
more recently, by Acemoglu and Pischke (2002), investigates the potential impacts of minimum
wage laws on life-cycle wage proﬁles through reductions in general human capital investment by
recent labor market entrants. Under either of the two bargaining speciﬁcations investigated here,
minimum wages, by truncating the lower tail of the accepted wage distribution, tend to produce less
wage growth over employment spells and the life cycle. In the bargaining speciﬁcation that allows
bidding between two competing employers, minimum wage eﬀects on wage growth are expected to be
especially pronounced, since the equilibrium wage function displays a “compensatings diﬀerential”
property, i.e., those jobs oﬀering the highest growth prospects oﬀer commensurately lower wages.5
Without a minimum wage, low wages are an (imperfect) indicator of high wage growth prospects.
The minimum wage limits the extent to which ﬁrms can “charge” an employee for this future wage
growth potential, thus reducing average wage growth in the market.
In introducing on-the-job search, the econometric framework employed in Flinn (2006) has to be
considerably revised. The point sample CPS data he used are no longer suﬃcient for determining the
parameters characterizing the more complicated employment processes modeled in this paper. We
utilize event history data taken from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), with
the data coming from the period 1997-2000, and estimate the primitive parameters of the model
using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator. We draw on some of the arguments
in Flinn (2006) in discussing sources of identiﬁcation in the model we use, and manage to obtain
reasonable model estimates under both bargaining speciﬁcations. We then consider the selection
of an optimal minimum wage under our two bargaining assumptions. We ﬁnd that the answers we
get diﬀer markedly across the two speciﬁcations, and explore the reasons why.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we derive the model and present
some analysis of the eﬀects on labor market outcomes of minimum wages with OTJ search. Section
3 contains a discussion of the data used to estimate the equilibrium model, while Section 4 develops
the MSM estimator we use. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 presents the
results of our policy experiments. In Section 7 we conclude.
5The reason for this is that future ﬁrms will have to bid against a high-valued θ to attract the worker. This
eﬀectively increases the outside option of the worker, and the ﬁrm demands compensation for this future bargaining
advantage by reducing the current wage oﬀer.
42M o d e l
In this section we describe the behavioral model of labor market search with matching and bar-
gaining in which the interactions between applicants and ﬁrms are constrained by the presence of
a minimum wage. The minimum wage, m, is set by the government and is assumed to apply to all
potential matches. We assume that the only compensation provided by the ﬁrm is the wage. As a
result, there are no other forms of compensation the ﬁrm can adjust so as to “undo” the minimum
wage payment requirement.
We restrict our attention to the case of exogenous contact rates in this paper. In Flinn (2006),
the model was estimated in both partial and general equilbrium settings, where the general equilib-
rium model made use of the matching function formulation typically used in macroeconomics. The
policy experiments produced vastly diﬀerent “optimal” minimum wages in the two cases, but formal
testing found no support for the general equilibrium framework. While it is obviously preferable
to conduct the policy analysis within a general equilibrium framework, the problem is that it is
only possible to estimate a highly restricted model of the demand side of the market. Given this
limitation, we have chosen to use a partial equilibrium framework throughout.6
As is common in the search literature, we use a Nash bargaining framework in the wage determi-
nation process. We estimate and evaluate the model under two alternative assumptions regarding
outside options. The diﬀerences and similarities of the two approaches are simple to describe. Say
that a ﬁrm currently employs a worker who has a certain productivity θ and is paid a wage w.
The employee meets another potential employer, and the (potential) productivity at that job is
immediately revealed to be θ0. In both of the bargaining settings we consider, eﬃcient mobility
decisions are made. That is, the employee will change ﬁrms if and only if θ0 >θ .The models diﬀer
in the wage determination process.
We devote most of our attention to the most theoretically interesting case, which allows direct
wage competition between ﬁrms. This setup has been used by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Dey
and Flinn (2005), and Cahuc et al. (2006). Firms, competing for the same individual’s services at
a moment in time, engage in a Bertrand competition for the employee, with the ﬁrm associated
with the worst productivity level dropping out of the auction at the point at which its proﬁt level
is zero. If, for example, the individual’s productivity at the new potential employer exceeds that
6This is the route often taken in the estimation of equilibrium search models. Some other recent and noteworthy
examples are Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006).
5at his current ﬁrm, so that θ0 >θ ,it is assumed that the current ﬁrm makes a (doomed) eﬀort to
retain her services by making higher and higher wage oﬀers until it drops out of the bidding at a
wage oﬀer ˜ w = θ. In this case, the employee moves to the new ﬁrm, and the outside option used
to set her wage is the value of being employed at the original ﬁrm at a wage equal to ˜ w = θ (i.e.,
when she receives all of the surplus of employment match).
The other situation that can arise under renegotiation is when the employee’s productivity at
the new ﬁrm is less than or equal to her current productivity, but greater than her current wage,
or w<θ 0 ≤ θ. Though the employee will not leave the current ﬁrm, given eﬃcient mobility, she
can use the threat of leaving to increase her current wage w. In this case, the potential employer
bids for the individual’s services until it reaches the point ˜ w = θ0, at which point it drops out of
the auction. The renegotiated wage at the current employer uses the value of being employed at
the match value θ0 with a wage equal to ˜ w = θ0 as the outside option.
Our second bargaining scenario considers the case in which each labor market participant’s
outside option value is equal to the value of unemployed search independent of their current labor
market state. Of course, this is the option value for those searching in the unemployment state at
the time they encounter a potential employer. The second bargaining scenario posits that it also
serves as the outside option for employed searchers. This may be due to the fact that employed
individuals are not able to credibly convey their current employment conditions (including wage or
wage oﬀer) to a new potential employer, while at the same time not being able to credibly reveal
current wage oﬀers from potential employers to their current employers.
An alternative justiﬁcation is one of lack of commitment. If oﬀers must be rejected or accepted at
the instant when they are tendered, then a worker loses his or her outside option the moment after it
is received. When the option is lost, the only relevant one becomes quitting into the unemployment
state, the value of which is always Vn. Thus wage payments will always be determined from this
outside option. Knowing this, a worker may insist that the ﬁrm transfer a lump sum amount to
them to obtain their services at the moment when they have two employment options. To the
extent that this is not recorded as a wage payment, this will have no eﬀect on the wage process.
Since all mobility is eﬃcient in any case, such payments will have no impact on the mobility process.
Thus the empirical wage-mobility process should be consistent with model assumptions even in the
presence of unobservable (to us) one-time payments associated with the receipt of an oﬀer by an
employed individual.
62.1 The Model with Renegotiation
The model assumes a stationary labor market environment and is formulated in continuous time.
We assume that there exists an invariant, technologically-determined distribution of worker-ﬁrm
productivity levels which is given by G(θ). To facilitate the numerical solution of the model, we
assume that the random variable θ is discrete, with the set of values θ can assume being given by
Ωθ = {θj}L
j=1, where 0 <θ 1 <. . .<θ L. When a potential employee and a ﬁrm meet, the productive
value of the match θ is immediately observed by both the applicant and the ﬁrm. At this point a
division of the match value is proposed using a Nash bargaining framework that is described below.
The searcher’s instantaneous discount rate is given by ρ>0. The rate of (exogenous) termination
of employment contracts is η>0.
While unemployed individuals search, their instantaneous utility is given by b, which can assume
positive or negative values. Unemployed workers meet ﬁrms at the exogenously-determined rate
λn. If both the ﬁrm and the worker accept the match, then they split it using a Nash bargaining
framework and determine a wage w(θ,U). The acceptance set of matches from the unemployment
state is given by A(m), with θA(m) being the minimal θ value in A(m) (further discussion of the
decision rule is provided below). It is assumed that labor is the only factor of production and if an
individual and a ﬁrm meet, but the ﬁrm "passes" on the applicant, then the ﬁrm receives a value
of 0.T h i si st h eﬁrm’s disagreement value in the Nash bargaining framework.7 Analagously, the
disagreement value for an unemployed searcher is the value of continued search, which is denoted
Vn(m).
While employed, workers meet ﬁrms at the exogenous rate λe which is independent of the
employed worker’s current match value. For simplicity, we assume that OTJ search is costless.
Letting w represent the worker’s wage, we denote the current labor market state of an employed
individual by (θ,w) and any potential new state by (θ0,w0). We now consider the rent division
problem facing a currently employed agent who encounters a new potential employer.
Let there be a currently employed individual with wage w and match value θ ∈ A(m),w h o
meets a new potential employer at which the match value is θ0. We assume that the potential
match value will only be reported to the current employer if the employee has an incentive to do
so. One situation in which this will be the case is when θ0 >θ . When this occurs, we assume that a
7In the general equilibrium version of the model, a free entry assumption implies that the expected value of a
vacancy is zero, which is why we impose this condition even in the partial equilibrium case. To see such a condition
imposed in an estimable general equilbrium version of this model without OTJ search, see Flinn (2006).
7bargaining process for the individual’s services begins between the current and potential employers
and stops when one of the ﬁrms’ surplus reaches zero, as in Bertrand competition. The winner of
the competition will be the current employer when θ0 >θ . Let the maximal value of the match θ to
t h ew o r k e rb eg i v e nb yQ(θ). Then the objective function for the Nash bargaining problem when
θ0 >θis:
S(θ0,w0,θ)={Ve(θ0,w0,θ) − Q(θ)}α ×{ Vf(θ0,w0,θ) − 0}1−α
where Vf(θ0,w0,θ) denotes the new ﬁrm’s value of the match, assuming that each ﬁrm’s threat point
is zero, and α ∈ (0,1) represents the bargaining power of the worker.
The ﬁrm’s value of the current employment contract is deﬁn e da sf o l l o w s .O v e ra ni n ﬁnitesimally
small period of time ε,t h eﬁrm earns a proﬁto f(θ − w)ε, which is discounted back to the present
with the "inﬁnitesimal" discount factor (1 + ρε)
−1. With “probability” ηε, the match is exogenously
terminated and the ﬁrm earns no proﬁt. With “probability” λeε, the worker receives a job oﬀer
from an alternative ﬁrm. If he reports this oﬀer to his current ﬁrm, his wage will be renegotiated.8
With approximate probability (1 − λeε − ηε), the worker does not receive another job oﬀer and is
not exogenously dismissed over the period ε. In this case the status quo is maintained. The term
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λeεP(˜ θ ≤ θ) × Vf(θ0,w0,θ)
´
+( λeεP(˜ θ ≥ θ0) × 0)
+
¡
(1 − λeε − ηε) × Vf(θ0,w0,θ)
¢
+ o(ε)},
where Vf(θ0,w(θ0,˜ θ),˜ θ) represents the equilibrium value to a ﬁrm of the productive match θ when
the worker’s next best option has a match e θ, and a value θj ∈ B(θ0,θ) i fa n do n l yi fθj ≤ θ0 and
θj >θ .
The interpretation of the arguments involving λe is as follows. Given a dominant and dominated
match value pair (θ0,θ), we can partition Ωθ into three sets. Since eﬃcient mobility is an implication
of our model structure, any new draw of a match value at a prospective employer that is greater
8Since the searcher has the option to not report any current match value, he will only do so when his employment
value at the current ﬁrm will increase, which only occurs when the wage increases.
8t h a nt h em a t c hv a l u ea tt h ec u r r e n te m p l o y e r ,θ0, results in an immediate departure. This event
implies a value to the ﬁrm of 0 under our assumption regarding its outside option. Moreover, if the
employee meets a prospective employer at which her productivity is equal to θ0, then she will be
indiﬀerent regarding which oﬀer to accept since both oﬀer a contract giving her all of the rents.9
Independent of whether she stays, the ﬁrm will receive a value of 0 in this case as well. By our
deﬁnition of the set B, we have assumed that she stays in such a case. However, the value to the
incumbent ﬁrm is 0, so it is indiﬀerent as well.
The set B(θ0,θ) contains all of those values that result in a renegotiation of the contract (w)
at the current ﬁrm and that don’t result in a departure. Since the total surplus associated with
a match value is strictly increasing in the match value, the amount of surplus the individual can
appropriate from θ0 is strictly increasing in the value of the outside option. If the current outside
option is θ, then any outside option greater than θ and less than θ0 will result in a renegotiation.
The value of the job to the ﬁrm at that point in time will be Vf(θ0,w(θ0,˜ θ),˜ θ), where w(θ0,˜ θ) will be
the new wage paid. Finally, all potential matches less than or equal to the current outside option
will not be reported to the ﬁrm, since the value of the outside option associated with these values
is no greater than the current one. When such an oﬀer arrives, the value of the ﬁrm’s problem does
not change. After rearranging terms and taking limits as ε → 0,w eh a v e
Vf(θ0,w0,θ)=
³
ρ + η + λeP(˜ θ>θ )
´−1
×{ θ − w + λe
X
˜ θ∈B(θ,θ0)
Vf(θ0,w(θ0,e θ),˜ θ)p(e θ)}.
The worker’s value of being employed is deﬁned similarly. For the employee, the value of
employment at a current match value θ and wage w is given by
Ve(θ0,w0,θ)=( 1+ρε)−1{wε+ ηεVn (m)+λeε[
X
˜ θ∈B(θ,θ0)




Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ0),θ0)P(e θ)) + P(˜ θ ≤ θ) × Ve(θ0,w0,θ))]
+(1 − λeε − ηε) × Ve(θ0,w0,θ)+o(ε)},
where Ve(θ0,w(θ0,θ),θ) is the equilibrium value of employment to a worker with match value θ0
when his next best option has a match value of θ and the set C(θ0) is the set of all θj ∈ Ωθ such
9This event has positive probability given our assumption that θ is a discrete random variable.
9that θj >θ 0. As we saw in the case of the ﬁr m ,w h e na ne m p l o y e ee n c o u n t e r saﬁrm with a new
match value e θ w h i c hi sl o w e rt h a nh i sc u r r e n tm a t c hθ but belongs to the set B(θ0,θ),h i sn e w
v a l u eo fe m p l o y m e n ta tt h ec u r r e n tﬁrm becomes Ve(θ0,w(θ0,e θ),˜ θ). Instead, when the match value
at the newly-contacted ﬁrm is greater than the current match value θ0, the employee will change
employers, and the new value of employment is given by Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ0),θ0).T h u s ,t h em a t c hv a l u e
at the current ﬁrm becomes the determinant of the threat point faced by the new ﬁrm and plays a
role in the determination of the new wage. Finally, when the match value at the prospective new
employer is less than the current dominated match value θ, the new contact is not reported to the
current ﬁrm since it would not improve the current contract. Because of this selective reporting,
the value of employment contracts must be monotonically increasing within a job with a particular
ﬁrm. As originally noted by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), wage declines can be observed when
moving directly between ﬁrms, though, of course, the value of the employment match must always
be increasing. After rearranging terms and taking limits, we have
Ve(θ0,w0,θ)=
³
ρ + η + λeP(˜ θ>θ )
´−1




Ve(θ0,w(θ0,e θ),˜ θ)p(e θ)+
X
˜ θ∈C(θ0)
Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ0),θ0)P(e θ)]}.
With a new match value of θ0 >θ , the surplus attained by the individual at the new match
value with respect to the value she could attain at the old match value after extracting all the
surplus associated with it is
Ve(θ0,w(θ0,θ),θ) − Q(θ),
where Q(θ) ≡ Ve(θ,w(θ,θ),θ) is the value of employment to the employee if he receives the total




ρ + η + λeP(˜ θ>θ )
´−1
×{ θ + ηVn (m)+λe
X
˜ θ∈C(θ)
Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ),θ)P(e θ)]}.
The model is closed after specifying the value of nonemployment, Vn (m). We will discuss the
manner in which minimum wages impact job acceptance, the unemployment rate, and the equilib-
rium wage oﬀer function in detail below. As we mentioned above, there is a minimal acceptable
match value from the unemployment state denoted by θA(m), such that for all θj ≥ θA(m) the match
10is accepted. Deﬁne the set of acceptable match values out of the unemployment state by D(θA(m)).
We note that for the ﬁrm to earn nonnegative ﬂow proﬁts, it is necessary that θA(m) ≥ m.
The searcher’s value of being unemployed is deﬁned as follows. The ε−look ahead formulation
of the Bellman equation for the unemployed searcher takes the form
Vn(m)=( 1 + ρε)−1{bε + λnε[
X
˜ θ∈D(θA(m))
Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ∗(m)),θ∗(m))P(e θ)]
+P(˜ θ<θ A(m))Vn(m)] + (1 − λnε) × Vn(m)+o(ε)}.
The value b is the ﬂow utility in the unemployment state. The “implicit” match value θ∗(m) is that
used as the outside option when determining the wage rate at the ﬁrst acceptable job oﬀer received
out of the state of unemployment. The value θ∗(m), is not, in general, an element of Ωθ. The second
term is the probability-weighted sum of the values of employment in all of the acceptable match
states. The third term corresponds to receiving an unacceptable oﬀer, and the fourth represents
the value of receiving no oﬀer. Taking the limit as ε → 0,w eh a v e
Vn (m)=
³
ρ + λnP(˜ θ ≥ θA(m)
´−1
×{ b + λn
X
˜ θ∈D(θA(m))
Ve(e θ,w(e θ,θ∗ (m)),θ∗(m))P(e θ)}.
The equilibrium wage function, w(θ0,θ), is deﬁn e da sf o l l o w s . W h e na ne m p l o y e da g e n tw i t h




When an unemployed agent meets a new potential employer, the solution to the Nash bargaining
problem is given by
w(θ,θ∗ (m)) = argmax
w≥m
Sn(θ,w,θ∗ (m)),
where Sn(θ,w,θ∗ (m)) = {Ve(θ,w) − Vn}α ×{ Vf(θ,w) − 0}1−α. The minimum wage acts as a
side-contraint in the Nash bargaining problem in both cases.
2.2 Analysis of the Model
In Flinn’s (2006) model without OTJ search, a binding minimum wage always served as the minimal
acceptable match value from the unemployment state. In our notation, with no OTJ search, it was
11always the case that
θ∗(m) ≤ m. (1)
A binding minimum wage created a (positive-valued) diﬀerence between the minimal accepted
match value and what was referred to as the “implicit” reservation match value, θ∗(m).
The situation can be markedly diﬀerent in the case in which there is a “signiﬁcant” amount
of OTJ search and when we allow for renegotiation. In this subsection, we illustrate why this
is so. We ﬁrst consider characteristics of the equilibrium wage function w(θ0,θ) when there is no
minimum wage constraint. We then look at the introduction of a minimum wage and pay particular
a t t e n t i o nt ot h ev a r i o u sw a y si nw h i c hi tm a yb e“ b i nding.” These distinctions will have important
ramiﬁcations for the determination of “optimal” minimum wage policies.
2.2.1 The Wage Function with m =0
In this section we describe the method of solution of the model and the properties of the equilibrium
wage function. The discrete θ assumption greatly facilitates solving and analyzing the model. Recall
that the set of values that θ can take is contained in the ﬁnite set Ωθ, where the L elements of the
set are ordered
0 <θ 1 <. . .<θ L < ∞. (2)










θj+1 θj+1 ... w(θL−1,θj+1) w(θL,θj+1)
θj θj w(θj+1,θj) ... w(θL−1,θj) w(θL,θj)
U w(θj,U) w(θj+1,U) ... w(θL−1,U) w(θL,U)
. (3)
The value θj = θA(0) in this case is the minimum acceptable match value for an unemployed
searcher. The wage function is not deﬁned for values of θk <θ A(0). Moreover, the bargaining
12mechanism always produces eﬃcient mobility, meaning that the current match value (i.e., the
“dominant” one) is always at least as large as the “dominated” match value, which generates the
outside option value in the Bertrand competition between ﬁrms.
An important feature of the Bertrand competition for workers and the discreteness of θ is that
when the dominated value is equal to the dominant value, a positive-probability event, the worker
captures all of the rents from the match. This means that the wage rate in this case is simply equal
to the match value, simplifying the computation of the equilibrium wage function.
The equilibrium wage function computation is conducted in the following recursive manner. We
begin by assuming that the only acceptable match value to an unemployed searcher is θL, which is
the largest match in the set Ωθ, so θA(0) = θL. We begin with a guess of the value of unemployment,
˜ Vn(θA). In terms of an employment spell, the state (θL,θL) is an absorbing state, since no further
job mobility can take place from that state during the current employment spell. The only way
such a spell can end is through exogenous termination, which occurs at the constant rate η. The
individual’s value of being in such a spell (given the value of unemployment ˜ Vn) is given by
˜ Ve(θL,θL,θL)=
θL + η˜ Vn(θL)
ρ + η
, (4)
where the second argument in ˜ Ve is the wage rate associated with the state (θL,θL), which happens
to be θL. The ﬁrm’s value is 0.
Now an unemployed searcher only accepts a match of θL, the probability of which is p(θL).
When the unemployed searcher accepts the one employment contract available to her, it has the
associated value
˜ Ve(θL,w,U)=
w + λep(θL)˜ Ve(θL,θL,θL)+η˜ Vn(θL)
ρ + λep(θL)+η
,





The wage associated with this state is then given by
˜ w(θL,U) = argmax
w (˜ Ve(θL,w,U) − ˜ Vn(θL))α˜ Vf(θL,w,U)1−α.
Then the (new) implied value of unemployed search is given by
˜ V 0
n(θL)=
b + λnp(θL)˜ Ve(θL,w,U)
ρ + λnp(θL)
.
13If ˜ V 0
n(θL) is suﬃciently “close to the initial guess ˜ Vn(θL), then we say that the value of search when
only θL is acceptable is given by V ∗
n(θL)=˜ V 0
n(θL). If not, replace ˜ Vn(θL) with ˜ V 0
n(θL), and repeat
the process. We then continue the iterations until convergence.10
A similar technique is used for the cases in which we set θA = θj,j=1 ,...,L− 1. Each
diﬀerent “potential” critical value implies a unique wage distribution associated with it and a value
o fu n e m p l o y e ds e a r c hg i v e nb yV ∗
n(θj). The optimal acceptance match chosen by the individual is
the one that produces that highest value of searching in the unemployment state, i.e.,
θA = θj ⇔ V ∗
n(θj)=m a x {V ∗
n(θk)}L
k=1.
The equilibrium wage matrix is the one associated with that value of θA. If, for example, L =1 0
and the θA = θ4, then the (lower triangular) wage matrix is 8 × 7.
This is the algorithmic approach used to compute the wage matrix in Table 1.1. Changes in
primitive parameters will of course sometimes change the critical acceptance match θA, but not
always due to the discreteness of the distribution. This will be observed in some of the examples
that we turn to now. While the discrete distribution assumption does have some negative aspects,
computation of the equilibrium wages/values is simpliﬁed and some of the impacts of minimum
wages on labor market outcomes and welfare are somewhat more transparent.
We now present an example of the wage function computation. We set the parameters of the
search environment at α = .25,λ n = .2,λ e = .05,η= .01,ρ= .01, and b = −5. We assume a six
point match distribuiton, with Ωθ = {5,8,11,14,17,20}, with an associated vector of probabilities
given by (.1 .2 .25 .2 .15 .1). The equilibrium wage distribution is given below:
10The mapping Vn = TV n, while typically not a contraction, is monotone increasing. Subject to existence condi-





Dominated θ Value 5 81 114 17 20
20 20
17 17.00 17.35
14 14.00 13.84 14.19
11 11.00 10.27 10.11 10.46
8 8.00 6.70 5.96 5.80 6.15
5 5.00 3.32 2.02 1.80 1.12 1.47
U 4.78 3.10 1.79 1.06 0.90 1.25
. (5)
At this set of labor market parameters, we note that all elements of Ωθ are acceptable from
the unemployment state. The most striking feature of the matrix is probably the degree of non-
monotonicity in the wages given and outside option U or some θj. For individuals coming out of
unemployment, the highest wage oﬀer attainable is the one associated with the lowest acceptable
match value, θ =5 . Although the value of the employment contract is strictly increasing in the
match value found by the unemployed searcher, wages are not. In fact, were it not for the wage
associated with the highest match value, exactly the opposite would be true. A similar pattern is
observed in every row of the matrix (those with more than three entries).
The low wages associated with the high match values, holding constant the dominated value,
are the employee’s payment for the future bargaining advantages the match conveys during the
employment spell. Under this set of parameters, the rate of meeting other employers, 0.05, is
quite high relative to the rate of exogenous termination of the job (and employment) spell, 0.01.
Combined with the relatively low discount rate of 0.01, the wage “compensation” for the future
bargaining advantage is high.
Obviously, when there is no OTJ search, a high match value delivers no future bargaining
advantage, and there are no compensating diﬀerentials observed in the wage function. As an
illustration, we determine the equilibrium wage rates for the same parameter values used to generate





Dominated θ Value 5 81 1 14 17 20
U 7.60 8.35 9.10 9.85 10.60
. (6)
In this case, the match value of 5 that was previously acceptable is no longer so. The wages are much
higher coming out of the unemployment state, since there is no bargaining advantage component of
remuneration. Most importantly, for our purposes, the wage function is monotonically increasing
in θ due to the fact that wages are the only compensation mechanism and the outside option is the
same, Vu, at all jobs.
Before concluding this subsection, we return to the example wage function in Table 1.2 to
discuss impliﬁcations of the model regarding patterns of wage changes over an employment spell.
Given the arrival of a “reportable” competing match value, that is, which is larger than the current
dominated match value, two things can occur. If the new match arrival is larger than the current
dominated match value and less than or equal to the current match value associated with the job,
there is no consequent mobility but there is renegotiation of the wage contract. Since the only
“negotiable” element of the employment contract is the wage, this is increased. Thus, while the
worker remains at the same ﬁrm, all wage changes are positive.
In the second case, where the new match value exceeds the value of the current match, there is
job mobility and contract negotiation. The old dominant match value becomes the new dominated
match value and serves as the outside option. Though both the dominant and dominated match
value increase with a job-to-job move, the wage rate need not. Once again, this is due to the fact
that part of the employee’s share of the surplus is generated by the OTJ bargaining option, and
this option value may increase to such an extent in the job-to-job move that a wage reduction is
required to satisfy the surplus division rule.
2.2.2 The Wage Function with m Binding
In the Flinn (2006) analysis without OTJ search, minimum wages could only be binding in one
particular manner, which was by constraining the choice set of the worker and the ﬁrm. In that
analysis, a binding minimum wage always produced an acceptance match value, θA in our notation,
16that was greater than what was called the “implicit” acceptable match value. In other words,
workers would have accepted lower matches than m, but were constrained not to by minimum wage
law. In that setting, the minimum wage essentially served as a coordination device that enabled
workers with little bargaining power to achieve more of the surplus produced by the match. The
cost of this gain was a lower probability of ﬁnding an acceptable match.
The minimum wage potentially plays an altogether diﬀerent role in the presence of OTJ search,
at least when the wage function displays nonmonotonicities of the type discussed in the previous
section. We illustrate the role of the minimum wage with two separate examples. All of the
parameters of the labor market environment are the same as they were in the example discussed
in the previous subsection. The only state variable that diﬀers from the example above and among
the two presented here is the minimum wage rate, m.
In the ﬁrst example, the minimum wage is set at $1.50. Since all match values are acceptable
when m =0 , and since the the minimum match value is 5, clearly all matches are still in the choice
set of the bargaining worker-ﬁrm pair, by which we mean that the ﬁr mc a ne a r nn o n z e r oﬂow proﬁts





Dominated θ Value 5 81 114 17 20
20 20
17 17.00 17.35
14 14.00 13.84 14.19
11 11.00 10.27 10.11 10.46
8 8.00 6.70 5.96 5.80 6.15
5 5.00 3.40 2.10 1.50 1.50 1.55
U 4.82 3.32 2.02 1.50 1.50 1.50
. (7)
The ﬁrst important thing to note about this example is that the acceptance match value has
remained the same at θA =5 . All matches that were previously accepted in equilibrium still
are. However, the minimum wage constraint on the bargaining process has changed the bargained
17outcomes for most of the wages associated with dominated values of θ =5and U. The impact has
come through the improvement in the wage distribution that resulted from not allowing for the
ﬁrm to be fully compensated for its contribution to the future bargaining power of the individual
during the current employment spell. Where the minimum wage is binding, the implication is that
individual is receiving more than their share of the surplus, which in our example is set at 0.25.
This is a plus for the individual’s side of the market, particularly those in unemployment and who
have found employment at the minimal acceptable match value. Firms still earn positive proﬁts
whenever they employ an individual who has a dominated match value less than the dominant one,
and minimum wages cannot aﬀect the wage payment when θ0 = θ.
We conclude this section with an illustration of the wage function when the minimum wage
is set at such a high level that an otherwise acceptable match value (to a searching individual) is
smaller than the minimum wage, and thus cannot lead to an employment match. Table 1.5 contains





Dominated θ Value 14 17 20
20 20
17 17.00 17.35
14 14.00 13.84 14.19
U 13.00 13.00 13.00
. (8)
In comparison with the relevant rows and columns of Table 1.4, the new, extremely high, value of
the minimum wage has no discernible impact on the wages negotiated during OTJ search. The new
minimum wage has a large impact on the wage oﬀers to currently unemployed workers, though the
probability of getting an acceptable oﬀer has substantially decreased.
2.3 Model with No Renegotiation
The model with renegotiation is considerably simpler to describe. As was discussed in the intro-
duction to this section, the outside option in this case is always equal to the value of unemployed
18search, Vn(m). There is eﬃcient mobility, which means that the match value at a new ﬁrm in a
job-to-job transition is strictly greater than the match value at the ﬁrm the individual is leaving.
This implies that all job-to-job transitions are associated with an increase in an individual’s wage.
Since there is no renegotiation, the wage at a given ﬁrm is constant over the duration of employment
at that ﬁrm.
2.3.1 The Case of m =0
We now characterize the mobility-wage process. With the value of unemployed search given by Vn,











j>ipj. Given our assumption regarding the outside option in the bargaining problem,
the value of the wage associated with acceptable match value θi is determined as
w(θi) = argmax
w
µw + ηVn + λe
P
j>ipjVe(θj)
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The wage-setting rule is a simple extension of that associated with the bargaining problem in the
absence of on-the-job search (see, e.g., Flinn, 2006), when λe =0 . This is to be expected given our
restriction on the threat point.
Proposition 1 Let θA = θi denote the minimal acceptable match values.
w(θi) <w (θi+1) <. . .<w (θL).
Proof: Since
λep+







is an increasing function of i, the result is obvious.¥
The monotonicity in the wage function in this case will have important implications in deter-
mining the optimal minimum wage rate. In the strategic renegotiation case, monotonicity of the
19wage in current match value depended on the values of the primitive parameters. In this case, it
does not.
The model, without minimum wages, is completed by determining the minimal acceptable
match value from the unemployment state. This is accomplished by computing the value of search
for each of the K possible acceptance sets, diﬀerentiated by the lowest match value included in the
set. Let the value of search be given by ˜ Vn(θi), when θi is the minimal acceptable value. Then
Vn =m a x {˜ Vn(θi)}L
i=1, and θA = θj is the associated minimal acceptable match value when the
argmax of the right hand side is equal to j.
2.3.2 Minimum Wages
Since the wage function is monotonically increasing in the match value, binding minimum wage
rates will have qualitatively similar eﬀects to those described in Flinn (2006), where there was no
on-the-job search. In particular, we will want to deﬁne the value of search in the unemployment
state as a function of the minimum wage rate, Vn(m). As was true in the model with renegotiation,
the set of feasible acceptable match values is truncated from below by the minimum wage, so that
the lowest acceptable match value must be at least equal to m.
Given the value of search, the wage associated with an acceptable match value θi is given by
wi(m)=m a x {m,αθi +( 1− α)((ρ + λep+




Since the second term in the max function is an increasing in θi, we see that the match values
that yield minimum wages are the lowest ones in the acceptance set, which is not true under
renegotiation when the wage functions are not monotone-increasing in the current match value.
We saw that, under our model estimates, minimum wage workers were likely to have high match
values coming out of the unemployment state due to the pronounced nonmonotonicity in the wage
functions.
The value of search in the unemployment state is determined in the same way as described for
the case of no binding minimum wage, except that θA is restricted to the subset of Ωθ that includes
only those values of θi ≥ m.
203D a t a
The data used to estimate the model contain information on individuals from the 1996 panel of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). A main objective of the SIPP is to provide
accurate and comprehensive information about the principal determinants of the income of individ-
ual households in the United States. The SIPP collects monthly information regarding individual’s
labor market activity including earnings, average hours worked, and whether the individual changed
jobs during the month, making it an attractive data set with which to study employment dynamics
of job seekers and workers.
Although the size of the SIPP’s target sample is quite large, our sample size has been greatly
reduced by several restrictions. We only consider individuals ages 16 to 30 who do not participate
in the armed services or in any welfare program (e.g., TANF, Food Stamps, WIC) during the
sample period. We focus on this age group since minimum wage earners are typically young. The
parameter estimates, particularly the bargaining power parameter, as well as the results from policy
simulations presented in subsequent sections, should be interpreted with this younger sample in
mind.
In addition to these general selection criteria, we impose a restriction that is particular to
estimating a stationary on-the-job search model with minimum wages. The minimum wage changed
from $4.75 to $5.15 on September 1, 1997, and remained at $5.15 for the remainder of the SIPP
survey period. Although the SIPP interviews individuals every four months for up to twelve times
from 1996 to 2000, we use data only from February 1998 to February 2000 in order to allow
adequate time for the labor market to adjust to the policy change and to avoid minimum wage
changes within the survey period. A drawback of deﬁning a sample window close to the end of the
panel, however, is that discontinuities in respondents’ employment histories become increasingly
present as individuals approach the end of the survey period. Because our econometric speciﬁcation
relies heavily on identifying transitions between labor market states, it is essential that individuals
have complete labor market histories. After excluding individuals with incomplete histories, our
ﬁnal sample consists of 3,048 individuals.
As we discuss in the next section, we use a moment-based estimation procedure to estimate
the model. The set of sample moments is estimated using cross-sectional data from February 1998
and February 1999, as well as data that describes individuals’ labor market dynamics between
these two points in time. The cross-sectional moments include the proportion of the sample that is
21unemployed, the mean and standard deviation of wages, and the proportion of workers who earn
the minimum wage. Other moments describe employment transitions and wage changes between
the two points in time. These moments include the proportion of individuals employed in February
1998 who lose their job before February 1999, and the mean wage change among workers who have
a job-to-job transition during the year.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics generated from the data. In February 1998, 4.3 percent of
the sample was unemployed. Among employed workers, the mean and standard deviation of wages
were $9.47 and $4.67,w i t h3.3 percent of workers earning the minimum wage. Our moment-based
estimation strategy allows us to include workers in the sample with wages below the minimum
wage, although they comprose a very small proportion of the sample.
Turning to measures of employment and wage dynamics, we ﬁnd that 29 percent of workers in
the sample who are employed in February 1998 transition directly to another job before February
1999 (i.e., there is no intervening spell of unemployment). The mean wage in February 1998 for
these workers is $8.43, about one dollar less than the mean wage of the full sample. While the mean
change in wages across jobs for these workers of $0.90 is fairly small, the distribution of changes is
considerably dispersed (the standard deviation of the change is $4.32). The size of the mean wage
change is due partially to the existence of wage decreases across consecutive jobs, as 32.2 percent
of employed workers accept new jobs with lower wages (see Figure 1). However, the nature of the
wage-bargaining process between individuals and ﬁrms in our model does not predict that wages
have to be at least as large at the destination job as at the current job in order for the individual
to leave the current job. That is, workers may leave their current jobs to accept new, lower wage
jobs if the option value of doing so is large enough.
The transition rate from employment to unemployment is also included in the set of moments
that measure employment dynamics. The percentage of individuals in the sample who are employed
in February 1998 who exit into unemployment before February 1999 is 6.4 percent. The group of
individuals who make this transition consists of both those who voluntarily leave their job and those
who are involuntarily dismissed. Among those individuals who make the opposite transition, from
unemployment to employment, the mean wage at the ﬁrst job is $8.48.T h i si sa b o u to n ed o l l a rl e s s
than the mean of the cross-sectional wage distribution in February 1998 for the full sample. The
distribution of initial wages for the individuals making this transition is also slightly less dispersed
than the cross-sectional distribution.
224 Estimation Method
In this section we discuss the simulation-based method used to estimate the primitive parameters
of the model developed above. Given the rather rich patterns of wage mobility and turnover that
the model generates, and the fact that the wage function is not (in general) monotonic in the value
of the current match under the bargaining model that allows renegotiation, the use of a maximum
likelihood estimator is problematic. We have opted to use a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM)
estimator instead.
The procedure used is similar to that employed by Dey and Flinn (2008) in their estimation of
a model of household (husband and wife) labor market search, which was also used implemented
using SIPP data. The panel data we have access to is used to construct an event-history data
set, in which the labor market status of each sample member is considered known at each point
in time during their sample participation period. Let m98 denote a set of sample characteristics
from the point sample constructed in February 1998, and let m99 denote the analagous sample
characteristics computed from the February 1999 point sample (recall that these are the same set
of individuals). Finally, let P99|98 denote a set of sample characteristics computed from February
1998 to February 1999 transitions of the sample members. For example, one such characteristic
could be the probability of observing the individual in the unemployment state in 1999 given that
they were in the employment state in 1998. Another might be the average wage of employed
individuals at the 1999 survey date who were unemployed at the time of the 1998 survey.
In using these moments in the estimation procedure we must make some strong assumptions
regarding initial conditions. For a number of reasons to be discussed below, we assume that the
population from which the sample is drawn is in the stationary portion of their labor market
careers. In the model, each individual begins his labor market career in the unemployment state,
so this assumption essentially implies that this initial condition has “worn oﬀ”b yt h et i m eas a m p l e
member’s career is point-sampled in February 1998. This assumption is likely to be violated for
extremely young sample members whose labor market careers are relatively short. Depending on
the primitive parameters, it may be reasonably appropriate for the older members of our sample.
One indication of whether this assumption is approximately satisﬁed involves a comparison of the
point-sampled sample characteristics from February 1998 and February 1999. If the steady state
assumption is reasonable, then
plim
N→∞
m98 =p l i m
N→∞
m99 = mSS,
23where mSS are the true steady state moments of the selected labor market characteristics. Given
the relatively large sample size of N =3 ,048, it is reasonable to assume that the asymptotic
arguments apply.
We performed a small, but formal, testing exercise to check the stationarity assumption. Because
our sample size is relatively large, we decided to divide the sample into two equal-size subsamples to
induce independence in the point samples across the two years; i.e., for one half of the (total) sample
(subsample S98), we used moment information from 1998, and for the other half (subsample S99),
we used moment information from 1999. We examined the equality of ﬁve sample characteristics:
the proportion unemployed, the average wage of the employed, the standard deviation in wages of
the unemployed, the proportion of the employed paid the minimum wage, and the proportion of
the employed paid more than 20 dollars an hour. Let the value of these sample characteristics be
denoted by ˆ mi,i=9 8 ,99. For each subsample, we then estimated a covariance matrix of these
sample characteristics by resampling Si 500 times. Let the estimated covariance matrices be given




a ∼ (ˆ m99 − ˆ m98)0(Z98 + Z99)−1(ˆ m99 − ˆ m98).
The value of the test statistic was a large 90.804, leading us to decisively neglect the null
hypothesis of stationarity. There are two primary reasons for such a large value of the test statistic,
in our opinion. The ﬁrst is nonstationarity in the labor market environment. This is the most
serious type of misspeciﬁcation we could face, since the entire modeling framework is premised on
the constancy of the “primitive” parameters characterizing the labor market environment. While
the actual labor market environment cannot be assumed constant over time, the question is whether
the actual ﬂuctuations are so large that our approximation of constancy is poor. Unfortunately,
there seems to be no way to access this without developing a full-blown search model in which the
primitive parameters are actually stochastic processes.
The second source of misspeciﬁcation is generated by the assumption that individuals are in
the steady state portion of their labor market careers. Since we study minimum wage workers, and
since these workers are largely young, we are forced to include recent labor market entrants in the
sample. Under our modeling assumptions, all participants begin their careers in the unemployment
state. This initial condition has probably not “worn oﬀ” for many of the youngest workers in our
sample, thus rendering inconsistent our estimates based on matching (approximately) steady state
moments from the model simulations with sample moments. This kind of concern is consistent
24with the empirical evidence. For example, the path to the steady state unemployment rate should
be monotonically decreasing as the cohort ages, while the average wage of the employed should be
monotonically increasing. We observe the proportion of the unemployed to decrease from 0.043 to
0.029 across the two years, while the average wage of the employed increases from $9.46 to $10.39.
Practically speaking, if we can accurately determine the date of entry into the labor market
environment of each sample member, there is no reason to use the steady state assumption in
forming the estimator. If we know that sample member i has been in the labor market for τi
periods as of the point sample date, then each simulated path can be point-sampled at time τi to
determine that sample member’s state. Such a procedure is the focus of our current estimation
eﬀorts, although it must be mentioned that the determination of the entry date into the labor
market is not straightforward for many sample members, particularly those who are currently
enrolled in school. For the present, we use the steady state assumption when computing the
sample characteristics from the simulated paths.11
Under the steady state assumption, it is straightforward to deﬁne the estimator. Let the value of
the sample characteristics used be given by X =( m0
98 P0
99|98)0, which is a column vector containing
K sample characteristics. Let the corresponding model counterparts, conditional on the parameter
vector ϕ, be given by ˜ X(ϕ)=( μSS(ϕ)0 π(ϕ)0)0. Given a method for computing ˜ X(ϕ), discussed
immediately below, the minimum distance estimator of ϕ is given by
ˆ ϕ =a r gm i n
ϕ (X − ˜ X(ϕ))0A(X − ˜ X(ϕ)),
where A is an K × K symmetric, positive deﬁnite weighting matrix. We compute the weighting
matrix by resampling the SIPP data matrix from which the sample characteristics, X, are computed.
The matrix A is the inverse of this estimated covariance matrix.
We assume that the sample is drawn from a homogeneous population, i.e., there exist no ob-
servable or unobservable persistent diﬀerences across population members. To compute ˜ X(ϕ), we
ﬁrst solve the model at the parameter vector ϕ, which gives us the equilibrium wage functions and
job acceptance rule. We then simulate R sample paths, which all begin in the unemployment state.
After a suﬃciently long period of time (about 20 years here), we point-sample each path, and then
point-sample the same path 12 months later. We then use the distributions of the states at the
11We are currently recomputing model estimates using the cross-sectional sample characteristics from1999, instead
of those from 1998, upon which our current estimates are based. We hope to get some idea of the sensitivity of
parameter estimates to the lack of stationarity observed in the data.
25ﬁrst point sample of the R paths to compute the steady state characteristics, μSS(ϕ). We use the
transition information between the two point samples to compute π(ϕ).
We have computed estimates of the standard errors by bootstrapping; this involved resampling
the original individual data to compute new values of X. For each bargaining structure, we generated
over 100 resamples.
4.1 Identiﬁcation
We estimate two speciﬁcations of the equilibrium model that vary in terms of the possibility of
renegotiation. The same parameters characterize both speciﬁcations, and there are no identiﬁcation
issues that are particular to either. Therefore we consider just the simpler (in terms of characterizing
the equilibrium of the model) case of no-renegotiation.
From the Flinn and Heckman (1982) identiﬁcation analysis of the partial-partial equilibrium
search model, we know that the c.d.f. G is not identiﬁed except under a class of parametric
assumptions. In our analysis, we utilize a discrete distribution of θ, so that the results of Flinn and
Heckman are not strictly applicable. The distribution of θ contains L points in its support, and it
is assumed that this set is known. The distribution of θ is then characterized in terms of K − 1
unknown probabilities, which can be a large number of parameters with the value K =3 0that we
utilize in the estimation. To eliminate this overparameterization, we deﬁn ec u tp o i n t sa tm i d p o i n t s








where c0 =0 ,c K =+ ∞, and ci =
θi+θi+1
2 for i =1 ,...,K− 1. In other words, we use a lognor-
mal assumption to assign probability mass across the support points. This makes the Flinn and
Heckman results applicable to the extent that we can think of our discrete θ distribution as an
approximation to an underlying continuous lognormal distribution.
They also showed that the parameters b and ρ were not individually identiﬁe d .A si sc o m m o n l y
done, we ﬁx the parameter ρ at a value reasonably commensurate with the interest rate. The value
we use (denominated in months) is ρ =0 .05/12. With ρ ﬁxed, it is in principle straightforward
to point identify b if the model is parameterized in terms of the critical match value given when
the match value is continuously distributed. With a discrete match distribution, the critical match
value will lie between points of support of the distribution, and hence is not uniquely determined. It
is possible to identify b by explicitly solving the value function at each new trial vector of primitive
26parameters ϕ, where ϕ contains the unknown value of b. This is what we do in our estimation
procedure, though at present we have not attempted to estimate b, but merely ﬁxi ta tt h ev a l u e
-2.12
W h i l ew ed on o tu s ee v e n th i s t o r yd a t ai nt h ee s timator, the steady state distributions and
transition probabilities have been found suﬃcient to yield reasonable and precise estimates of the
transition rate parameters (λn,λ e,η) using the SIPP data. For example, Dey and Flinn (2008)
estimate a joint husband-wife labor market search model using a similar estimation strategy, and
obtain precise estimates of the transition rate parameters for both husbands and wives. While
their model is not set in an equilibrium framework, the transition dynamics are more complex
than those generated by ours. We are conﬁdent that a MSM approach based on reasonable sample
characteristics can yield “good” estimates of these parameters, which is borne out in our empirical
results.
The most vexing problem we face is the estimation of the bargaining power parameter α using
only information from the supply side of the market. Flinn (2006) showed that, for a continuously
distributed θ, as u ﬃcient condition for identiﬁcation of α was the G not belong to a location-scale
family. He assumed that G was lognormal, which belongs to a log location-scale family, but not a
location-scale family. Monte Carlo experiments showed that α could be recovered when extremely
large samples were available under this functional form assumption.
In our application, the situation is worse on one hand and better on the other. We do not
have a continously-distributed θ, so his results are not directly applicable. As we argued above,
thinking of our discrete distribution as an approximation to an underlying continuous lognormal
ameliorates this problem. On the positive side, our model with on-the-job search provides a richer
mapping from a ﬁxed-population wage-oﬀer distribution, a set of outside options (determined by
primitive parameters), and the bargaining power parameter than did the one he faced in the no
OTJ case. Wage changes across ﬁrms during the same employment spell provide a rich potential
source of identifying information about primitive parameters, including α, that is not present when
all employment spells consist of one job spell.
12It is notoriously diﬃcult to precisely estimate b, the evidence being the large standard errors assoicated with point
estimates of this parameter, usually “backed out” of the model in a ﬁnal estimation step (see Flinn and Heckman,
1982). Given the length of time it took to estimate the model that allows renegotiation of employment contracts, we
decided to merely ﬁx this value in the estimation and policy experiments.
275R e s u l t s
Table 3 contains estimates from the model in which workers are allowed to renegotiate their wage
with their current ﬁrm and the model in which renegotiation is not allowed. We refer to these as
the "renegotiation" and "no renegotiation" models when describing the estimates below.
We ﬁrst report the estimates from the model with renegotiation and then compare these es-
timates with those obtained without renegotiation. The estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table
3 indicate that the average time between contacts for unemployed searchers is (0.421)−1,s l i g h t l y
over 2.4 months. When an unemployed searcher receives a job oﬀer, the probability he accepts
it is ˜ G(m)=0 .691. Thus, the estimated length of an unemployment spell is (λn ˜ G(m))−1 =3 .4
months. Once employed, an individual receives an alternative job oﬀer from a competing ﬁrm ap-
proximately every (0.063)−1 =1 5 .9 months. Given an alternative job oﬀer, the probability that
the worker accepts it depends on his or her current wage and current match value. The estimated
exogenous dissolution rate of jobs is 0.007, implying that workers are exogenously terminated from
their jobs every 11.4 years on average.
The estimates of the rate parameters diﬀer depending on whether renegotiation is allowed.
The estimates of the model without renegotiation indicate that the average time between contacts
for unemployed searchers is (0.306)−1,o r3.3 months, slightly less than one month greater than
the time between contacts in the model with renegotiation. When a job oﬀer is received by an
unemployed searcher, the probability he accepts it is ˜ G(m)=0 .455. Thus, the estimated length
of an unemployment spell is (λn ˜ G(m))−1 =7 .2 months. Once employed, an individual receives
an alternative job oﬀer from a competing ﬁrm approximately every (0.152)−1 =6 .6 months. This
is approximately twice as frequent in as in the model with renegotiation. This is expected, since
in order to generate the same amount of wage dispersion in a model without renegotiation, oﬀers
must arrive more frequently. The estimated exogenous dissolution rate of jobs is 0.008,w h i c hi s
slightly greater than in the model with renegotiation. This implies that workers are exogenously
terminated from their jobs every 9.5 years on average.
In the model with renegotiation, the average ln match draw in the population is 2.309 with a
standard deviation of 0.339 (the implied mean and standard deviation of the match draw θ in levels
are 10.66 and 3.72). Without renegotiation, these values are 1.634 and 0.625 (with the mean and
standard deviation of the match draw θ in levels being 6.234 and 4.313). The diﬀerences in these
parameters across models stem from diﬀerences in the estimates of the bargaining power parameter.
28When renegotiation is allowed, the estimate of the bargaining power parameter for workers is 0.20,
w h i l ei ti s0.45 when workers are not allowed to renegotiate. Thus, low bargaining power in the ﬁrst
model causes observed wages to be mapped to a match distribution that is centered to the right of
the match distribution corresponding to a higher bargaining power.13
Figures 2.a and 2.b plot the wage function against workers’ current match value. Figure 2.a
depicts the case in which workers are not allowed to renegotiate their wage at their current job. The
wage function is increasing in the current match value, as expected. Figure 2.b depicts the case
in which workers are allowed to renegotiate their wage at their current job. Each wage function
plotted in this ﬁgure corresponds to a diﬀerent outside option. The wage functions corresponding
to the outside options of unemployment, U, and the minimal acceptable match value, θ9,a r e
nonmonotone.14 Workers coming out of unemployment, for example, accept lower initial wages at
jobs with higher match values as payment for future bargaining advantages. The wage function
loses this feature as the outside option increases. Outside options of at least θ14, for example,
produce a wage function that is increasing in the dominant match value.
6 Policy Experiments and Comparative Statics Results
In this section we look at the impact of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare,
using the estimates of primitive parameters we obtained under our two bargaining speciﬁcations.
As we will see, the implications regarding the optimal minimum wage level depends critically on
which speciﬁcation of the bargaining environment we assume. We begin our analysis by looking
at the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth over the life cycle and over the course of an
employment spell (i.e., a sequence of job spells with no intervening unemployment spell).
13The estimate of the bargaining power parameter is of particular importance in determining the eﬀect of an
increase in the minimum wage on labor market outcomes. In Flinn (2006), in which workers were not allowed to
search on the job, the estimate of the bargaining power parameter was 0.424 with a standard deviation of 0.007.I n
the model in which renegotiation was allowed, the value of the bargaining power parameter was signiﬁcantly lower
than 0.424. While the data sets and econometric speciﬁcations of the models are diﬀerent, we attribute this result
to allowing workers to receive alternative job oﬀers from competing ﬁrms with which they can renegotiate their wage
at their current job. We will return to a discussion of the implications of this result on labor market welfare in the
following section.
14The model is estimated using a 30-point discrete match distribution. Given our parameter estimates, the ﬁrst
eight match values are not feasible in equilibrium.
296.1 Minimum Wage Eﬀects on Wage Proﬁles
The work of Leighton and Mincer (1981), and, more recently, by Acemoglu and Pischke (2002),
investigates the potential impacts of minimum wage laws on life-cycle wage proﬁles through re-
ductions in general human capital investment by recent labor market entrants. While we do not
consider human capital investment in our model, the potential for minimum wage impacts on the
shape of lifetime wage proﬁl e se x i s t sd u et oe ﬀects on the bargaining environment. Under either of
the two bargaining speciﬁcations investigated here, minimum wages, by truncating the lower tail
of the accepted wage distribution, tend to produce less wage growth over employment spells and
t h el i f ec y c l e .
We perform two simulations. The ﬁrst examines how the minimum wage aﬀects workers’ wage
proﬁles in their ﬁrst employment spell, while the second examines how the minimum wage aﬀects
workers’ age-earnings proﬁles (i.e., over a labor market career). In both cases, we simulate proﬁles
using models with and without renegotiation at the worker’s current job using minimum wages of
$5.15, $7.15, $9.15,a n d$11.15. For each value of the minimum wage, we re-solve the model holding
constant all parameter estimates.
Figures 3.a and 3.b plot the average wage as a function of the time elapsed in individuals’ ﬁrst
employment spells for various minimum wage values for the model without and with renegotiation.
All individuals begin the simulation in unemployment and the average wage is obtained at each
month of the ﬁrst employment spell. This spell can consist of one job or many jobs and ends
when the worker is exogenously dismissed from employment. For both models and for all four
minimum wages, the wage proﬁles increase with time. In the model without renegotiation at the
current job, the average wage increases solely due to job-to-job transitions. While this eﬀect is also
present in the model in which renegotiation is allowed, intraﬁrm competition generates increasing
wages at workers’ current job as well. Comparing the wage proﬁl e sa c r o s sm o d e l sg i v e nam i n i m u m
wage of $5.15, we observe that average wages increase more quickly in the early months of the
workers’ ﬁrst employment spells when renegotiation is not allowed. This may be attributed to
workers experiencing wage decreases when renegotiating their wage at their current ﬁrm in the
model with renegotiation.
The eﬀect of increasing the minimum wage is the same across models, with higher minimum
wages ﬂattening the wage proﬁles in each ﬁgure. In both models, higher minimum wages increase
the minimally acceptable match value for unemployed workers. Thus, workers that ﬁnd jobs earn
30higher wages intially, but the smaller set of viable (larger) match values decreases the chances of a
worker ﬁnding an alternative ﬁrm that will oﬀer him a higher wage. There is less wage growth as a
result. In the bargaining speciﬁcation that allows bidding between two competing employers, the
equilibrium wage function displays a “compensatings diﬀerential” property, i.e., those jobs oﬀering
the highest growth prospects oﬀer commensurately lower wages. The reason for this is that future
ﬁrms will have to bid against a high-valued match value to attract the worker. This eﬀectively
increases the outside option of the worker, and the ﬁrm demands compensation for this future
bargaining advantage by reducing the current wage oﬀer. In this case, the minimum wage limits
the extent to which ﬁrms can “charge” an employee for this future wage growth potential, thus
reducing average wage growth in the market.
Figures 4.a and 4.b depict the eﬀect of the minimum wage on workers’ age-earnings proﬁles.
The labor market career of any individual can consist of many labor market cycles, deﬁned as
sequences of labor market states beginning with an unemployment spell and ending with the last
job prior to the following unemployment spell for a given individual. Thus, throughout their labor
market career, individuals can become employed at a job, renegotiate their wage at their current
job (in one of our speciﬁcations), change jobs to receive a higher wage, and become exogenously
terminated and return to unemployment.
Figures 4.a and 4.b show that individuals’ age-earnings proﬁles are increasing in age. Most wage
growth occurs early in their labor market careers. There are two eﬀects of increasing the minimum
wage on these age-earnings proﬁles. The ﬁrst is that average wages are higher at any point in time
in the labor market career. By shrinking the set of viable matches available to the searcher while
unemployed (the standard (negative) employment eﬀect), the minimum wage impacts workers’
wage proﬁles by delaying the start of the ﬁrm competition process during which signiﬁcant wage
gains occur. Thus, higher minimum wages delay entry into employment, but guarantee better job
oﬀers once employed. The second eﬀect is that wage proﬁles ﬂatten out earlier in individuals’ labor
market careers when minimum wages are higher. Workers receive better oﬀers once employed, but
these oﬀers arrive less frequently when the minimum wage is higher. This is similar to the eﬀects
observed in Figures 3.a and 3.b.
6.2 Optimal Minimum Wages
In this subsection we determine the optimal minimum wage under a few diﬀerent welfare measures
for both of our bargaining environment assumptions. Since our analysis is set in a partial equilibrium
31framework, we don’t look at eﬃciency issues in determining an optimal minimum wage, as in Flinn
(2006); our minimum wages are optimal solely in a distributional sense.
Since we condition on labor market participation, a dubious assumption depending on the level
of the minimum wage, we conﬁne our attention to four distinct sets of agents at any moment in time.
The ﬁr s ta r et h eu n e m p l o y e d .E v e r y o n ei nt h i ss t a t eh a st h es a m ev a l u e ,Vn(m). The proportion





where pU(m) is the probability of drawing a match value in the acceptable set under the minimum
wage of m.
The proportion of employed individuals in the labor market is simple 1 − πU(m), obviously.
The average welfare of employed individuals is a complicated expression under OTJ search, since
the wage distribution is a mapping from the steady state distribution of dominant and dominated







We can obtain an arbitrarily good approximation to EVe(m) through simulation, without explicitly
having to determine pSS(θ0,θ|m), fortunately.
T u r n i n gt ot h eﬁrms’ side of the market, a similar situation prevails. For ﬁrms with vacancies,
the value of the vacancy is zero. Outside of general equilibrium, where the number of vacancies is
determined, the measure of ﬁrms with vacancies is indeterminant. However, for each worker, there
is a ﬁrm with a ﬁlled vacancy. Therefore the measure of ﬁrms with employees is 1 − pU(m). The







Putting all of these terms together, an egalitarian social welfare function can be written
W(m)=pU(m)Vn(m)+( 1− pU(m))EVe(m)+( 1− pU(m))EVf(m).
This function is egalitarian in the sense that each individual and ﬁrm is given the same weight in
determining aggregate welfare.
We ﬁrst examine the impact of the minimum wage on the equilibrium steady state probability of
unemployment. The situation for the two bargaining environments is presented in Figures 5.a and
325.b. Due to the discreteness of the match distribution, we see that the unemployment probability
function is a step function in m. We can also note that, at each value of m, the unemployment
probability is greater under the no-renegotiation case than under renegotiation. This ordering
is not pre-ordained by the theory, since we use diﬀerent sets of parameter estimates to compute
these functions for the two bargaining situations. What should be true is that, at the same set
of parameter values, the equilibrium unemployment rate would be no less under no renegotiation,
since the value of employment across all states can be no greater than under renegotiation. The
main thing to note, for future reference, is that high minimum wages can induce a substantial
increase in the steady state unemployment rate under either bargaining situation.
In Figures 6.a and 6.b we graph the values or expected values for the sets of agents just de-
scribed as a function of the minimum wage, and we present the aggregate measure W(m) as well,
which is weighted by the class proportions. Once again, we see discontinuities in these curves as
increases in the minimum wages result in a reduction in the feasible set of match values. These
eliminations can be “voluntary” or “involuntary,” loosely speaking. In the case of no renegotia-
tion, all of these discontinuities occur when the minimum wage is increased above an otherwise
acceptable match value, which we label “involuntary,” since it arises directly from the increase in
an external constraint. In the case of renegotiation, there also exist “voluntary” eliminations, when
the equilibrium wage function is non-monotone. In this case, an increase in the minimum wage can
improve the value of unemployed search to such a degree that agents eliminate a match value from
their acceptance set even if it still feasible (i.e., yields non-negative ﬂow proﬁts to the ﬁrm).
If we just focus attention on the aggegate welfare measure in these ﬁgures, we see that they have
a roughly concave shape, once the minimum wage starts to bind and ignoring the discontinuities.
This was found in Flinn (2006), as well. We see that the minimum wage has a much less beneﬁcial
eﬀect in the case without renegotiation. While a binding minimum wage does improve aggregate
welfare, the maximizing level is at $8.00 an hour. When we allow for renegotiation between workers
and ﬁrms, the situation changes dramatically. In this case, the optimal minimum wage in terms
of maximizing W is $15.00. This is mainly due to the fact that adverse employment eﬀects are
essentially absent in the model with renegotiation until we get to very high levels of the minimum
wage.
Turning to Table 4, we see a sizable amount of variation in the minimum wage that maximizes
the welfare of each set of agents, the percent change in average welfare for each set of agents from
moving from the baseline minimum wage of $5.15 to the optimal minimum wage, and the unem-
33ployment rate at the optimal minimum wage. There are gains in the average welfare of unemployed
and employed workers of 1.7 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively, in the model with no renegoti-
ation which are signiﬁcantly less than the gains of 19.3 percent and 21.3 percent, respectively, in
the model with renegotiation. While a diﬀerent set of parameters governs the search environment
in each model, setting a high mininmum wage impacts worker welfare less in the model with rene-
gotiation. While this is also the case in the aggregate labor market, consisting of all workers and
ﬁrms, the diﬀerence in the percent change in welfare is mitigated slightly by the eﬀect of the mini-
mum wage on the welfare of ﬁrms with ﬁlled vacancies. In the model without renegotiation, ﬁrms
that employ workers experience a 42.5 percent increase in average welfare at the optimal minimum
wage, whereas the increase is 28.9 percent in the model with renegotiation. While increases in the
minimum wage render match values less than the minimum wage unacceptable in both models,
they prevent the ﬁrm from being fully compenstated for its contribution to the future bargaining
power of the individual in the model in which renegotiation is allowed. Though the parameter
estimates diﬀer across simulations of each model, we attribute the lower welfare gain for ﬁrms with
ﬁlled vacancies to this second eﬀect.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In a matching model with search frictions and on-the-job search, minimum wages may “bind” in
diﬀerent ways depending on the nature of the worker-ﬁrm bargaining problem. We found that in
a model that allowed for “bidding wars” between ﬁrms, minimum wages may bind at relatively
high match values, somewhat counterintuitively. The reason is that high match values, particularly
when the individual is coming from the unemployment state, may have a high value in terms of
the future bargaining advantages they convey during the current employment spell. To pay for this
advantage, workers obtain a lower ﬂow wage rate. Hence, over a certain range, minimum wages
may merely impact the degree to which ﬁrms can charge employees for the bargaining advantage
associated with the match value. Only at high values of m does the minimum wage eliminate
otherwise advantageous match values.
The situation is diﬀerent in the no-renegotiation case, where the value of unemployed search,
given m, always served as the outside option in the Nash bargaining problem. In that case, as
was true in the no OTJ framework investigated in Flinn (2006), binding minimum wages always
eliminated otherwise acceptable match values. This leads to “nonadvantageous” increases in the
34equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases the costs of imposing high values of m. As a result,
the optimal minimum wages found under this regime were about one-half as high as they were
under Bertrand competition for workers. There seems to be some anecdotal evidence suggesting
that ﬁrms often follow the policy of not responding to outside oﬀers (except, notably, in the U.S.
academic sector), which is more consistent with our no renegotiation case. The optimal minimum
wage implications of that case also seem more reasonable, though we have not, as yet, developed
a formal apparatus to test between the two bargaining speciﬁcations. This is an objective of our
current research.
In their search, matching, and Nash bargaining frameworks, Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc
et al. (2006) found that allowing for OTJ search substantially reduced the estimate of the worker’s
bargaining power parameter in comparison with the case in which OTJ search was not introduced
(e.g., Flinn, 2006). Our results here show that this is an artifact of allowing for Bertrand competi-
tion. When competition between ﬁrms is introduced, substantial wage gains over an employment
spell can be generated simply from this phenemenon, even when the individual possesses little or
no bargaining power in terms of α.15 When we allow for Bertrand competition, the estimated
value of α is 0.20. When we assume no wage competition between ﬁrms, the estimate increases to
0.45. This latter estimate is very similar to Flinn’s (2006) estimate of α using a sample of younger
workers drawn from the Current Population Survey. Thus, the outside option appearing in the
Nash bargaining problem is a key determinant of the estimates obtained of primitive parameters
and the optimal minimum wage.
Aside from the important goal of testing between the alternative bargaining scenarios, we are
pursuing two extensions of the research reported here. The ﬁrst, described in the section on estima-
tion, is to relax the steady state assumption when generating simulated sample paths from which
simulated sample characteristics are computed. Given such young individuals, the stationarity as-
sumption is questionable, as we noted in that section, can formally be rejected. At the present
time, we don’t know how sensitive our model estimates are to a misspeciﬁcation along these lines.
The second extension is to add a labor market participation decision to the model, as was done in
Flinn (2006). Under the Bertrand competition assumption, the optimal minimum wage was found
to be $15.00. It is hard to believe that such a high value of m would not have potentially profound
eﬀects on the number of individuals in the labor market. We think it is important to try to capture
15The (approximately) limiting case of this is that considered by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), in which workers
possessed no bargaining power whatsoever.
35such changes in conducting a more robust welfare analysis.
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Feb 1998 Feb 1999
Proportion unemployed 0.043 0.030
Mean wage $9.47 $10.39
Standard deviation of wages $4.67 $5.09
Proportion of minimum wage earners 0.033 0.018
Proportion earning wage greater than $20 0.043 0.053
Proportion employed in Feb 1998 that exit into unemployment within 12 months 0.064
Proportion employed in Feb 1998 with at least one job change within 12 months 0.291
Mean wage at initial job among individuals employed
in Feb 1998 who have job-to-job transition before Feb 1999
$8.43
Mean wage change among individuals employed
in Feb 1998 who have job-to-job transition before Feb 1999
$0.90
Standard deviation of wage change among individuals employed
in Feb 1998 who have job-to-job transition before Feb 1999
$4.33
Mean wage at ﬁrst job for those unemployed in Feb 1998
who become employed within 12 months
$8.48
Standard deviation of wages at ﬁrst job for those unemployed in Feb 1998







































Note: Instantaneous value of search, b, set



















Optimal m $7.00 $9.00 $14.05 $8.00 $8.00
Percent Change With
Respect to Baseline
(m =$ 5 .15)
0.017 0.024 0.425 0.017 0.016
Unemployment Rate
(Baseline =0 .058)
0.075 0.122 0.411 0.096 0.096
With Renegotiation
Optimal m $14.00 $16.00 $18.05 $16.00 $15.00
Percent Change With
Respect to Baseline
(m =$ 5 .15)
0.193 0.213 0.289 0.195 0.161
Unemployment Rate
(Baseline =0 .058)
0.083 0.147 0.369 0.147 0.110
41